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INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II 
(The Use of Force, Human Rights and 
General International Legal Issues) 
hy 
Richard B. Lillich* 
As my Brother Moore rightly suggests in his Introduction to Volume 
I, "some of the best writing on international law has appeared in the 
Naval War College Review." I need add only that "some of the best" of 
this "best writing" has been on the not unrelated subjects of the use of 
force and international human rights, the two areas upon which most of 
the contributions to this volume focus. Writing an Introduction to such 
a remarkable collection of articles presents an editor with two principal 
alternatives. Either he surveys the various contributions in "once-over-
lightly" fashion-stressing their originality, taking issue with an occa-
sional fine point, and attempting throughout to whet the reader's 
appetite for the intellectual fare to follow-or he ignores them entirely 
and produces an independent piece of scholarship on some topic 
supposedly of compelling interest. Actually, I intend to borrow a bit 
from both approaches, taking the views of the various contributors on 
two specific points-forcible self-help to protect nationals abroad and 
the impact of international human rights norms upon the U.S. foreign 
policy process-and weaving them with some of my own views into 
what hopefully will be an interesting, if not necessarily an avant garde, 
pattern. 
Forcible Self-Help to Protect Nationals Ahroad 
Under the UN Charter, as Admiral Miller points out, member states 
foreswore the unilateral use of force in international relations save in 
*Howard W. Smith Professor of Law, University of Virginia, and President, 
Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute .. Sometime Charles H. Stockton 
Chair of International Law, United States Naval War College. 
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the case of self-defense. "There should be little doubt," he concludes 
from his examination of the relevant Charter provisions, "that 
unilateral, forcible self-help as an acceptable sanction in international 
law has been prohibited.,,1 While it seems clear that it was the intention 
of the framers to achieve just this result, they.also intended, as a quid 
pro quo to states for this surrender of a portion of their sovereignty, 
that the UN would take collective measures in the future to enforce 
compliance with the Charter's obligations. Such measures, as everyone 
knows,. rarely have been taken. Indeed, it can be said without much 
overstatement that the Charter provisions in this regard have atrophied. 
Ambassador Rosenne, in a generally pessimistic assessment of the 
present state of the collective security concept, goes so far as to 
conclude that "the original scheme has failed, and its replacement has 
not yet begun to take clear shape.,,2 The latter half of this compound 
sentence offers little comfort or guidance to the government planner, 
much less to the naval officer faced with an on-the-spot decision. 
To take as an example a situation which has occurred time and again 
in the past and undoubtedly will occur with some frequency in the 
future, what action can a state take to protect its nationals living in a 
foreign state when their lives are endangered by a complete breakdown 
of law and order in that state? Under customary international law, it 
was blackletter law that a state, invoking its right of forcible self-help, 
could send its navy and land its marines to protect the lives of its 
citizens in such a situation. Indeed, as Commander Woods points out in 
his scholarly article on the U.S. Navy Regulations covering this issue, 
from 1893 onward they specifically "tasked naval officers with the 
responsibility of exercising their independent judgment in the applica-
tion of force to protect the lives and property of U.S. citizens on 
foreign soil against actual or impending arbitrary violence ... 3 While the 
specific provisions discussed by Woods have been deleted from the 
1973 edition of the regulations-to be replaced by a somewhat opaque 
admonition that "[ t] he use of force in time of peace ... is illegal 
except as an act of self-defense,,4 -his and several other articles 
contained in this volume contain useful analyses and helpful guidelines 
for decisionmakers in this area. 
If recent history is any guide, the problem of protecting nationals 
abroad will be one of particular concern to the U.S. for some time. The 
articles in this volume focus upon the three "classic" cases where the 
U.S. has used forcible self-help and defended the legality of its actions 
under international law in general and the UN Charter in specific-the 
I Miller, "Collective Intervention and the Law of the Charter," page 77 of this 
volume at page 81. 
2Rosenne, "International Law and the Use of Force," page 1 of this volume at 
page 7. 
3Woods, "U.S. Navy Regulations, International Law, and the Organization of 
American States," at page 16 of this volume. 
4For the full text of the applicable articles, see page xiv infra. 
landing in Lebanon in 1958, the Congo rescue operation in 1964, and 
the Dominican Republic action in 1965. Since their original publica-
tion, moreover, other situations have arisen where forcible self-help 
either was used or contemplated-the Mayaguez incident and the 
evacuation of U.S. nationals from Iran being the most prominent 
examples. Varying the fact pattern somewhat, the rash of aerial 
hijackings-in which passengers are held hostage to the achievement of 
political, pecuniary or personal goals-has raised the same legal issues in 
a new and different context. Indeed, an examination of the Israeli raid 
on Entebbe in 1976 shows how the norms discussed in several articles 
in this volume have been used by the international legal community in 
appraising this use of forcible self-help. 
This Introduction is not the place to discuss the Entebbe raid in 
detail. Interested readers will find it considered at some length in my 
forthcoming monograph in the "Blue Book" Series-Forcible Self-Help 
to Protect Nationals Abroad. Suffice it to say that, given the 
well-known facts of Entebbe situation, nearly all commentators have 
approved the Israeli rescue operation and considered it a valid exercise 
of the right of forcible self-help which they consider still exists under 
contemporary international law.5 In the Security Council debate that 
followed Entebbe, the U.S. once again reaffirmed its recognition of a 
state's right to take forcible steps to protect its nationals abroad. 
Israel's action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a 
temporary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda. Nor-
mally, such a breach would be impermissible under the Charter of 
the United Nations. However, there is a well established right to 
use limited force for the protection of one's own nationals from 
the imminent threat of injury or death in a situation .where the 
state in whose territory they are located is either unwilling or 
unable to protect them. The right, flowing from the right of 
self-defense, is limited to such use of force as is necessary and 
appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury. 6 
5Green, "Rescue at Entebbe-Legal Aspects," 6 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN 
RIGHTS 312 (1976); Knisbacher, "The Entebbe Operation: A Legal Analysis of 
Israel's Rescue Action," 12 J. INT'L L. & EC. 57 (1977); Knft, "Self-Defense and 
Self-Help: The Israeli Raid on Entebbe," 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 43 (1977); 
Salter, "Commando Coup at Entebbe: Humanitarian Intervention or Barbaric 
Aggression?" 11 INT'L LAW. 331 (1977); and Note, "Use of Force for the 
Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe Incident," 9 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT'L. 117 (1977). Compare Sheehan, "The Entebbe Raid: The Principle of 
Self-Help in International Law As Justification for State Use of Armed Force," 1 
FLETCHER FORUM 135 (1977) (recommends new concept of "rectification"), 
with Paust, "Entebbe and Self-Help: The Israeli Response to Terrorism," 2 
FLETCHER FORUM 86 ~1978) (urges retention of traditional concept of 
self.help. 
631 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (1976). 
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Note that this right, while stoutly defended, is described only as one 
"flowing from the right of self-defense .... " Can and should it not be 
·defined with more precision? 
'The answer obviously is in the affirmative. A quick glance at several 
of the articles in this volume provides some definitional help, more, it 
must be added, than most of the legal literature on Entebbe.7 
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that this literature nowhere cites or 
otherwise makes use of these articles which had appeared some years 
before in the Naval War College Review. Such research oversights, 
understandable in view of the fact that not all nonmilitary authors have 
ready access to the Review, hopefully will occur with diminishing 
frequency now that the present two volumes are in print. 'Thus the 
articles discussed immediately below should have considerable impact 
upon the protection of nationals debates in coming years. 
Take, for instance, the previously-mentioned article by Admiral 
Miller. As we have seen, contrary to the stereotype of military lawYers 
held by many civilians, Miller ends his textual analysis of the impact of 
the UN Charter upon the customary norms governing the protection of 
nationals abroad with a conclusion which not all government decision-
makers, military or otherwise, will welcome: namely, that the Charter 
prohibits forcible self-help.8 The counterweight to this prohibition, he 
proceeds to relate, is the. substitute of collective action by the UN. Yet 
Miller, unlike some international lawYers who focus their eyes on the 
text of the Charter almost exclusively,9 is not unaware of the principle 
that the subsequent conduct of parties to a treaty is relevant to its 
interpretation. "Whether or not the charter has constructed collective 
machinery adequate to [its] purpose," he rightly observes, 
is quite another question and, it would seem, a most crucial one. 
For if the promised substitute for unilateral action is not 
forthcoming, states could hardly be expected to refrain from 
developing other procedures and perhaps from even falling back 
to their prior practice of unilateral forcible self-help .... It is 
abundantly clear_ from current international practice that this 
process has long since begun. l ° 
One example he cites is the Dominican Republic. While not taking a 
position himself on whether the U.S.'s actions were legal or not-once 
again demonstrating his independence from the official line taken by 
the U.S. Government at the time-he does note that many com-
7 See note 5 supra. An exception is Paust's short comment. 
8See text at note 1 supra. 
9 See, e.g;, Brownlie, "Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen," in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139 (R. 
Lillich ed. 1973). Compare Brownlie, "Humanitarian Intervention," in LAW AND 
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974), with Lillich, 
"Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive 
Alternatives," in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (J.N. 
Moore ed. 1974). 
lOMiller, supra note I, at 80. 
mentators have called the initial landing of marines to protect and 
evacuate U.S. nationals "a legitimate exercise of unilateral self-defense 
or unilateral forcible self-help for humanitarian purposes. ,,11 Since his 
article concerns the legitimacy of collective action by regional 
organizations, he does not venture to define these two concepts or 
clarify the criteria for their invocation. 
This task is attempted with some success by Commander Woods. 
While never explicitly distinguishing between the two concepts, he 
repeatedly makes clear his belief that unilateral forceful action to 
protect nationals abroad can be justified under contemporary interna-
tionallaw only if such action is deemed "to .be encompassed within the 
concept of self-defense.,,12 Using these criteria formulated by Judge 
Waldock-"(l) an imminent threat of injury to nationals, (2) a failure 
or inability on the part of th~ territorial sovereignty to protect them 
and (3) measures of protection strictly confined to the object of 
protecting them against injury ,,1 3 -he concludes that "the original 
limited intervention in the disorders of the Dominican Republic on 28 
April 1965 to protect U.S. citizens from imminent danger in a situation 
of anarchy did not violate standards of customary international law. ,,14 
Woods claims support for this conclusion from Article 0614 of the U.S. 
Navy Regulations of 1948, then in force, which under the rubric of the 
"right of self-preservation" specifically authorized (and, indeed, man-
dated) the use of force to protect "the lives and property of [U.S.] 
citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending .... " 
In the best tradition of the Navy JAG, however, Commander Woods 
does not accept the authoritativeness of the above article unquestion-
ably, always a prudent approach and an especially wise one in this case 
in view of the fact that the article had remained unchanged since the 
late Nineteenth Century. 1 5 Reviewing it against contemporary interna-
tionallaw, he finds it no longer completely compatible and hence urges 
the Navy 
to update article 0614 to conform to modem stanciqrds of 
customary international law. It is suggestea that this can be 
accomplished by the simple expediency of deleting any reference 
1 lId. at 96. 
l2Woods, supra note 3, at 30. 
l3Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of -Force by Individual States in 
Intemational Law," 81 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of International 
Law) 455, 467 (1952-II). 
l4Woods, supra note 3, at 26. 
15 See text at note 3 supra. "Your present [pre-1973] Navy Regulations I was 
able to trace .•• back to 1893. They are almost in haec verba now with what- they 
were in 1893. Since then we have had "the Hague convention, the League of 
Nations, the Kellog-Briand Pact, and the United Nations Charter. I gently 
[suggest] that it might be a good idea to -reassess these sections of the Navy 
Regulations to see whether they [are] in conformity with international law •... " 
Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help Under International Law," page 129 of this volume 
at page 133. 
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to "property" and substituting the words "self-defense" for the 
outmoded language "self-preservation" wherever the latter 
appears. Additionally, bearing in mind the serious international 
consequences that an application of force could entail, it is 
suggested that specific operation orders be written with a view 
toward giving commanding officers definitive guidance in the 
enforcement of this right, emphasizing the concept of evacuation 
over all other means of protection.1 6 
His call here fell on receptive ears, for the 1973 edition of the 
regulations not only shifts the juridical rationale for the use of force 
from self-preservation to self-defense, but also eliminates any reference 
to protecting the "property" of U.S. nationals. The new regulations 
provide as follows: 
0914. Violations of International Law and Treaties. 
On occasions when injury to the United States or to citizens 
thereof is committed or threatened in violation of the principles 
of international law or in violation of rights existing under a 
treaty or other international agreement, the senior officer present 
shall consult with the diplomatic or consular representatives of 
the United States, if possible, and he shall take such action as is 
demanded by the gravity of the situation. In time of peace, action 
inVOlving the use of force may be taken only in consonance with 
the provisions of the succeeding article of these regulations. The 
responsibility for any application of force rests wholly upon the 
senior officer present. He shall report immediately all the facts to 
the Secretary of the Navy. 
0915. Use of Force Against Another State. 
1. The use of force in time of peace by United States naval 
personnel against another nation or against anyone within the 
territories thereof is illegal except as an act of self-defense. The 
right of self-defense may arise in order to counter either the use 
of force or an immediate threat of the use of force. 
2. The conditions calling for the application of the right of 
self-defense cannot be precisely defined beforehand, but must be 
left to the sound judgment of responsible naval personnel who are 
to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and 
forebearance. The right of self-defense must be exercised only as 
a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely 
necessary to accomplish the end required. 
3. Force must never be used with a view to inflicting 
punishment for acts already committed. 
Like its predecessor, however, Article 0915(2) does not spell out 
satisfactorily the criteria to be used in determining when force may be 
used to protect U.S. nationals. Instead, on the ground that "[t]he 
conditions calling for the application of the right of self-defense cannot 
be precisely defined beforehand," it leaves the decision "to the sound 
judgment of responsible naval personnel who are to perform their 
16Woods, supra note 3, at 30. 
duties in this respect with all possible care and forebearance." From 
whence, then, is the naval commander (or operations order writer or 
other decisionmaker) to get the "definitive guidance" Woods states-
and everyone must agree-he needs? 
Considerable help is provided by Captain McHugh in his article 
"Forcible Self-Help in International Law."l 7 As his title indicates, 
unlike Miller, who straddles the question, and Woods, who opts for the 
self-defense theory, McHugh adopts the forcible self-help rationale to 
justify the protection of U.S. nationals abroad. In this respect he joins 
company not only with me, 1 8 but with Professor Myres S. McDougal, 
one of the leading U.S. international lawyers of this century and the 
distinguished co-author of the leading treatise on the use of force in 
international law.19 In an article in the Naval War College Review, 
reprinted in Volume I, McDougal graphically demonstrates how his own 
thinking on forcible self-help has shifted in light of post-Charter state 
practice. The importance of his views warrants the following quotation 
of unaccustomed length: 
It has been argued ... that only two kinds of uses of force, 
transnational force, are now authorized. One is the self-defense 
that is authorized under article 51, the other is the collective 
police action of the organization which is authorized in chapter 
VII of the Charter. I'm ashamed to confess that at one time I lent 
my support to the suggestion that article 2(4) and the related 
articles did preclude the use of self-help less than self-defense. On 
reflection, I think that this .was a very grave mistake, that article 
2(4) and article 51 must be interpreted differently .... 
[T]he first important fact is that the machinery for collective 
police action projected by the Charter has never been imple-
mented. We don't have the police forces for the United Nations, 
the collective machinery that was expected to replace self-help. In 
other words, there has been a failure in certain of the major 
provisions for implementing the Charter. 
If, in the light of this failure, we consider how we can 
implement the principal purposes of minimizing coercion, of 
insuring that states do not profit by coercion and violence, I 
submit to you that it is simply to honor lawlessness to hold that 
the members of one state can, with impunity, attack the 
nationals-individuals, ships, aircraft or other assets-of other 
states without any fear of response. In the absence of collective 
machinery to protect against attack and deprivation, I would 
suggest that the principle of major purpose requires an interpreta-
tion which would honor self-help against prior unlawfulness. The 
principle of subsequent conduct certainly confirms this .... 
17McHugh, "Forcible Self·Help in International Law," at page 139 of this 
volume. 
18See note 15 supra. 
19McDougal & Feliciano, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: 
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961). 
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Hence, if I had the opportunity to rewrite the book with Mr. 
Feliciano in which we mildly questioned the lawfulness of 
self-help less than self-defense, I think I would come out with a 
different conclusion, as many people have.20" 
While McHugh does not cite this extract in his own article, his analysis 
obviously was influenced by McDougal, whose treatise he relies upon 
heavily. 
McHugh's primary contribution, however, is his refinement of 
various criteria, which Professor Richard A. Falk first advanced 10 
years ago, by which the legality of a state's claim of forcible self-help 
may be judged.21 Under these criteria, the use of force by states may 
be acceptable provided: 
-That acts of provocation by the target state have raised an 
imminent and significant threat to the continued existence of a 
nation's political independence and/or territorial integrity. 
-That, if possible, a diligent effort has been made to obtain 
satisfaction by pacific means. 
-That recourse to international organizations is had as prac-
ticable. 
-That a state accepts the burden of persuasion and makes a 
prompt explanation of its conduct before the relevant organ of 
community review, showing a disposition to accord respect to its 
will. 
-That the acting state's purpose cannot be achieved by acting 
within its own territory. 
-That the use of force is proportional to the provocation and 
directed against military and paramilitary targets and clearly 
indicates the contours of the unacceptable provocation. 
-That the user of force continues to seek a pacific settlement of 
the underlying dispute on reasonable terms. 2 2 
Applying these criteria to the Dominican Republic action, McHugh 
thinks the initial landings to protect and evacuate U.S. nationals pass 
international muster. "It is submitted," he suggests, "that intervention 
for this purpose in the future would be hard to fault.,,2 3 The 
conclusions reached by the commentators on Entebbe bear him out.2 4 
20 McDougal, "Authority to Use Force on the High Seas," 20 NAVAL WAR 
COLLEGE REV. 19, 28-29 (Dec. 1967), at page 551 of Volume I of these 
reprints. 
21 Falk, "The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation," 63 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 415, 441-42 (1969). Other criteria, specifically formulated for the 
protection of nationals context, may be found in Nanda, "The United States' 
Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order-part I," 43 
DENVER L.J. 439, 475 (1966); Lillich, "Forcible Self-Help to Protect Human 
Rights," 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 347-51 (1967); and Moore, "The Control of 
Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict," 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205,264 (1969). 
22McHugh, supra note 17, at 154. 
23 Id• at 152. 
24 See note 5 supra. 
The several articles discussed above constitute, in my opinion, a 
most valuable contribution to a topic of great complexity and 
continuing importance. They have been instrumental, as has been seen, 
in bringing the Navy Regulations into line with contemporary interna-
tionallaw. Moreover, they raise issues of policy and suggest criteria for 
decision that will prove highly useful in coming years to policy planners 
and naval officers alike. Their republication herein will assure them of 
the wide audience they deserve. 
International Human Rights Norms 
and the U.S. Foreign Policy Process 
Turning to the articles in this volume which touch upon interna-
tional human rights, one is struck both by their number and the wide 
range of issues they cover. Perhaps that is because under the Carter 
Administration our consciences have been raised about the issue of 
human rights, not only at home but also abroad. Yet the concern for 
human rights, somewhat paradoxically in the view of some civilians, 
always has been prominent among members of the naval profession. 
Forcible self-help to protect nationals abroad, after all, is no more than 
the rudimentary procedure by which states seek to protect the 
substantive human rights-the most basic of which is the right to life 
itself-of individuals. Human rights factors are influential if not 
necessarily controlling in a host of other international law fields as well. 
Professor Louis Sohn, at the outset of his article on "International Law 
and Basic Human Rights," correctly states that: 
[ t ] his is an area of international law in which, over the y~ars, we 
developed perhaps more law than in other areas. If you look at 
the jurisprudence of international tribunals, you discover that 
more cases deal with problems of human rights than with rights 
and duties of states themselves.2 5 
In addition to the traditional international law governing the 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, upon which Sohn 
focuses, the other major body of law concerned with human rights in 
pre-Charter days was the Law of War. Few if any international laWYers 
would dissent from Professor Tucker's assertion that "the traditional 
law of war [was] one of the most worthwhile achievements of the 18th 
and 19th centuries. _ .. ,,26 Beginning just over a century ago and 
culminating in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (soon to be 
supplemented by the two Geneva Protocols of 1977), a vast body.of 
substantive and procedural law came into. being, the purpose of which 
was to regulate and humanize the conduct of armed conflict. This )lody 
of law, ably canvassed by Professor Gerald Draper, 2 7 arose from the 
25 Sohn, "International Law and Basic Human Rights," at page 587 of this 
volume. 
26Tucker, "The Law of War," at page 233 of this volume. 
27Draper, "Rules Governing the Conduct of Hostilities-The Laws of War and 
Their Enforcement," at page 247 of this volume. 
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concern to protect, insofar as it is possible in wartime, the human rights 
of individuals, whether combatants or civilians. As Judge Baxter 
explains, 
[ t] he reason for the application of law in this area is to be found 
in a fundamental human response to warfare and human misery. 
We realize that even though millions may be suffering, this offers 
no justification to add one more person to that group if injury to 
him can be avoided. To find the basis for this, you must go back 
to the respect for human dignity and for the worth of the 
individual, which is the foundation of civilization itself.2 8 
The Law of War covers a vast range of subjects, most of which 
receive treatment in this volume. The articles by Baldwin, Grabb and 
Hearn together comprise a comprehensive study of the Status of Forces 
Agreements, a .major purpose of which is to guarantee U.S. military 
personnel garrisoned abroad procedural due process should they be 
tried in foreign courts. Several articles, including one by the President 
of the Naval War College, Admiral Stockdale, raise legal and other issues 
concerning the treatment of prisoners of war in Vietnam; of especial 
interest is Commander Naughton's psychological portrait of the U.S. 
POW, which describes the stresses to which they were subjected and the 
creative responses by which they resisted enemy pressure. 2 9 Other 
articles treat specific types of weapons and warfare (DeSaussure on air 
warfare, Levie on mine warfare, and Miller on naval warfare). Professor 
Levie, in a short but meaty article entitled "Combat Restraints,,,30 
examines the four specific areas of military necessity, reprisals, 
protection of civilian noncombatants and protection of paws. "The 
problem in this area," he concludes, "is not lack of law, it is lack of 
compliance with the law.,,31 
Enforcing the law in this area is a problem, as it is in other areas of 
international law where human rights concerns are manifest. "If the 
international law of war is to accomplish anything," writes Baxter, "if 
real restraints are to be placed upon violence in warfare, the wrongdoer 
must be held criminally accountable for violations of the law.,,3 2 The 
difficulty with following this prescription is that no international court, 
as Professor Briggs' review of the Nuremberg Tribunal established after 
World War II reminds us, exists to try alleged war criminals, and that 
(pace Colonel Poydasheff) the use of courts-martial to try the My Lai 
defendants clearly demonstrates, at least in my opinion, that the 
process by which an offender is tried by his or her own military 
establishment has not yet been made to "work." In view of the 
well-known facts about My Lai, which led to only six prosecutions and 
28 Baxter, "The Law of War," page 209 of this volume at page 212. 
29Naughton, "Motivational Factors of American Prisoners of War Held by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam," at page 379 of this volume. 
30Levie, "Combat Restraints," at page 201 of this volume. 
31 ld. at 207. 
32 Baxter, supra note 28, at 213. 
but one conviction, that of Lieutenant Calley, who is now free on 
parole, it simply "boggles the mind" to be told that "the My Lai cases, 
posing the problem they did, were properly and correctly resolved by 
the U.S. Army.,,33 
Enforcing the Law of War by prosecuting alleged wrongdoers 
presents some legal as well as administrative problems. In the forefront 
are the interrelated issues of command responsibility and superior 
orders. (In the My Lai cases, it will be recalled, Captain Medina argued 
that he was not responsible for the crimes Calley and his men 
committed since he [Medina] had no actual knowledge of their acts; 
Calley, conversely, claimed that he merely was carrying out Medina's 
orders and hence was not responsible himself.) 
Insofar as command responsibility is concerned, military com-
manders obviously are responsible for war crimes when the acts in 
question were committed by their men pursuant to their orders. 
Moreover-and here I quote, inter alia, from Paragraph 501 of The U.S. 
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare-a commander 
is also responsible if he has actual knowlege, or should have 
knowledge, through reports received by him or through other 
means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are 
about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to 
take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with 
the law of war- or to punish violations thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
The italicized phrase, which reflects the rule of broad if not absolute 
command responsibility applied in the Yamashita Case,34 is a key 
factor in the enforcement of the law of war since it in effect requires 
affirmative action by the commander, action which if taken will reduce 
the likelihood of the law's violation. The surprising failure to charge the 
court members correctly in the case of Captain Medina, who was found 
not guilty after a charge repeatedly emphasizing that his actual 
knowledge of the acts of Calley and his men at My Lai was necessary 
for conviction, constitutes a retreat from the standards of Yamashita 
and Field Manual 27-10. 
Joining this unfortunate retreat is Colonel Hart, whose enterprising 
search intol the unpublished records of the Board of Review in 
Yamashita reveals that the five army officers sitting on it clearly 
thought that the evidence submitted to the Military Commission which 
tried the General connected him with actual knowledge of the activities 
for which he eventually paid with his life. Since, as Hart_points out, 
"[t]he Military Commission failed to address the question_of knowl-
edge explicitly,,,3 5 what he calls "the so-called Yamashita principle,,3 6 
33Poydasheff, "Military Justice: A Reinforcer of Discipline," page 426 of this 
volume at page 432. 
34 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
35Hart, "Yamashita, Nuremberg and Vietnam: Command Responsibility 
Reappraised," page 397 of this volume at page 404. 
36I d. at 412. 
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emerged. In fact, he argues, it "does not exist legally.u37 This 
interesting attempt to rewrite legal history seems plausible at flrst 
glance, but it runs counter to what has emerged as the accepted-and 
desirable-rule of command responsibility. Moreover, it clearly conflicts 
with the above-quoted paragraph of Field Manual 27-10, which the 
author nowhere cites. 
With respect to the defense of superior orders, Paragraph 509(a) of 
the Field Manual restates the accepted rule, namely, that they do not 
constitute a defense in .the trial of an accused individual, unless he 
did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to 
know that the act ordered was unlawful. 
The defense did not save Lieutenant Calley in his court-martial, as 
Colonel Poydasheff explains, because the presumed order of Captain 
Medina could not have been considered valid, and because "Calley 
should have known that killing unarmed, unresisting men, women, and 
children was illegal.u38 In my opinion, Poydasheff, in his attempt at "a 
reconciliation of law and military ethics, U goes too far in favor of the 
latter when he parses Calley to read that "the servicemember is bound 
only to refuse patently illegal orders or those that he personally knows 
are illegalu39 This gloss of Paragraph 509(a), which the author does 
not cite [although he does quote in full the explanatory and seemingly 
more exculpatory Paragraph 509(b)], reflects a more lenient attitude 
toward the alleged wrongdoer than is desirable if a serious effort to 
enforce the law of war by means of individual responsibility is to be 
maintained. 
Whether this approach is workable in any event is an issue raised by 
Draper. 
On balance I am inclined to think, after a long and somewhat 
painful experience in war crimes forums, that the moral, social, 
and disciplinary effects of thorough instructions in the law of war 
in general, and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in particu-
lar, ... may in the long run prove more persuasive of law 
observance and dissuasive of its breach than the execution or long 
imprisonment of war criminals . 
. . . Instruction in the law of war and the humanitarian code of 
conduct enjoined thereby, render the recipient aware that there 
are permanent legal norms, based upon the moral, humane, and 
rational order, which transcend municipal laws and superior 
orders at variance with or denying that order. Governments which 
fail to give that instruction in the law of war now required by the 
law of war render their armed forces and civil population and the 
entire community of civilized men and women, a gross disservice 
which posterity will not fail to condemn. Governments have been 
given full and adequate warning. Let them disregard it at their 
peril.40 
37Id• 
38Poydasheff, supra note 33, at 434. 
39Id• at 435 (emphasis added). 
40Draper, supra note 27, at 261-62. 
These prophetic words, written at the beginning of the Vietnam War, 
unfortunately were not heeded initially and one result was My Lai. 
Subsequent improvements in educating servic~men in the law of war 
have been far more successful, and if contiriued and improved should 
supplement if not supplant traditional methods of enforcement. 
In an entirely different area, where human rights concerns once 
again directly impact upon the duties and responsibilities of the naval 
officer, Colonel Mann41 and Professor Goldie42 both recount the 
unsuccessful attempt by a Lithuanian seaman on a Soviet ship to obtain 
political asylum aboard the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Vigilant in 
November 1970. Although the seaman was able to make it aboard the 
cutter, a Soviet boarding party subsequently was permitted to remove 
him by force. Clearly this summary denial of asylum violated the U.S.'s 
obligations under the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,43 
and the officers concerned paid the price in reprimands, retirements 
and shore duty. Although there was no Coast Guard regulation in force 
concerning the granting of asylum,44 the various persons concerned in 
making the unfortunate decision would have received woefully mis-
leading guidance from Article 0621 of the Navy Regulations of 1948, 
then in force, which opened with a flatly wrong sentence stating that 
"[ t] he right of asylum for political or other refugees has no foundation 
in international law." Clearly, the above Protocol being the supreme 
law of the land under the U.S. Constitution, Article 0621 was void, 
invalid and in need of revision. Goldie's suggested revisions were 
adopted almost lock, stock and barrel in Article 0940 of the 1973 
edition of the regulations,4 5 demonstrating once again the action-
oriented thrust of many of the articles in this volume.4 6 
Bringing order to one's own house is a major human rights concern, 
and by so doing the U.S. strengthens its hand when it comes to 
asserting human rights .claims against other countries. Ambassador 
Hauser, in an insightful article on "International Law and Basic Human 
Rights,,,47 makes a strong plea for the U.S. to ratify the various human 
rights treaties which it signed, some of which have been pending in the 
Senate for over three decades. She is not particularly optimistic on this 
41 Mann, II Asylum Denied: The Vigilant Incident," at page 598 of this volume. 
42Goldie, "Legal Aspects of the Refusal of Asylum by U.S. Coast Guard on 
23 November 1970," at page 626 of this volume. 
43protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed- Jan. 31, 1967, entered 
into force Oct. 4,1967; 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
The protocol incorporates -by reference the substantive provisions of the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 
1951, entered into force Apr. 22, 1954,189 U.N.T.S., which the U.S. had not 
ratified. 
44Mann, supra note 41, at 618. 
45 Goldie, supra note 42, at 38-39. 
46 See text at notes 15-17 supra. 




score, pointing out that "while a good number of our Senators imd it 
quite correct to comment publicly on the treatment, let us say, of Jews 
by the Soviets, lhos by the Nigerians, or Anguillans by the British, they 
cannot accept the idea that the rest of the world would see fit to 
comment on the way in which our Government treats its own 
citizens. 114 8 The attitude she describes not only is logically inconsis-
tent, but it is shortsighted as well. The U.S. has little to lose and much 
to gain by supporting human rights claims both here and abroad. 
Baxter, writing about respect for the law of war, makes a similar point. 
"1 think you will agree with me," he states, 
that one of the great objectives of the United States and of the 
West in the long-range struggle in which we are engaged is the 
establishment for the entire world of the rule of law. If we 
ourselves do -not adhere to that standard and demand compliance 
with the rule of law by those who may be arrayed against us, we 
will have abandoned one of the vital objectives we are bent upon 
attaining.49 
The full impact of international human rights norms on the U.S_ 
foreign policy process is just beginning to be felt. s 0 It is appropriate 
that President Carter, a former naval officer, has been the single most 
important person in bringing this situation to pass. The articles 
mentioned in this volume contain a host of useful data and ideas about 
the role that international law, and especially international human 
rights law, can play in the shaping of a defense and foreign policy that 
will protect the national security needs of the U.S. while simul-
taneously contributing to the development of a just and stable 
international legal order. 
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